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The main arguments of the paper are as follows: dual mismatches of foreign borrowings, 
ie  currency and maturity mismatches, were important causes of the East Asian financial 
crisis. Accordingly, it is necessary to develop the region’s bond markets. In particular, 
unifying government bond markets and central bank debt markets may contribute to the 
development of bond markets. 
The benefits of unifying government bond markets and central bank debt markets are as 
follows: an increase in liquidity in the secondary bond market through the development of the 
repo market and thereby the development of the government bond market; and advantages 
for monetary operations through greater influence on short-term rates with the help of a 
reduction in the burden of redemptions of maturing debt and interest payments. 
 
Outstanding amounts of government,  
public and corporate bonds in Korea 
End of period, in trillions of won 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Monetary 
Stabilisation 
Bonds  25.8 25.0 23.5 45.7 51.5 66.4 79.1 84.3  105.5 
Government 
bonds  23.3 25.7 28.6 41.6 61.2 71.2 82.4 98.3  135.8 
(Treasury 
bonds) 3.0  4.9  6.3  18.8  34.2 42.6 50.9 55.6 81.4 
Corporate 
bonds 61.0  76.0  90.1  122.7  119.7 133.6 154.4 180.0 187.4 
Total  164.6 190.0 234.2 343.9 376.2 429.3 501.6 544.8 574.1 
 
Looking at the table, these suggestions seem acceptable, but there are some practical 
problems, which include: the difficulty of creating synergy effects from the consolidation of 
two markets to reduce the liquidity premium; and the possibility of reducing the efficiency and 
independence of monetary policy.  
First, as relates to the difficulty of creating synergy effects from the consolidation, it should be 
taken into account that the two debts have different characteristics. In particular, government 
bonds have a relatively easy periodical issuance and are readily fungible, while central bank 
debt is issued to offset changes in bank reserves due to autonomous factors such as flows of 
government funds or changes in foreign exchange holdings.  
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Second, as relates to the possibility of reducing the efficiency and independence of monetary 
policy, it should be pointed out that, in fact, it is difficult to reach an agreement on the issue of 
government bonds for monetary stabilisation, and the practical procedures for reaching an 
agreement on the issue from the parliament are complicated. 
As an alternative, it may be suggested that bonds be issued by the central bank and interest 
on them be paid by the government, as in Germany, New Zealand and Israel, etc. In 
Germany, an issue of three-, six- and nine-month government bonds up to DM 25 billion was 
decided by the Bundesbank, and in New Zealand, government bonds and central bank debt 
of three-month maturities for monetary operations are used together for monetary 
stabilisation, with the interest on the central bank debt paid by the government. More central 
bank independence is a prerequisite to the implementation of these policies. 
As another alternative in Korea, a more feasible step-by-step approach may be considered, 
taking the current situation into account. As a first step, quasi-fiscal burdens of the Bank of 
Korea due to aggregate credit ceiling loans, and the underwriting of non-performing asset 
management fund bonds etc would be transferred to the government to reduce the issuance 
of Monetary Stabilisation Bonds (MSBs). As a second step, interest on MSBs would be paid 
by the government. And as a third step, Monetary Stabilisation Government Bonds (MSGBs) 
would be substituted for MSBs. Amounts, time and conditions of the issue of MSGBs up to a 
certain amount agreed on by the parliament would be decided by the BOK. 
In order to introduce these approaches, it is important to have independence and 
coordination between government bonds and MSBs, and monetary, fiscal and foreign 
exchange rate policies. Step-by-step substitution of the government bonds for MSBs seems 
more feasible and desirable, in line with the improvement of circumstances for the 
independence of the central bank and of understanding about the use of government bonds 
for monetary policy operation. 